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AI: ARTIFICIAL INVENTOR OR THE REAL DEAL?
Anna Carnochan Comer*
The utilization of Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) in the process of
innovation has been occurring for decades. However, with the
increased sophistication of AI, it is becoming gradually more
difficult to discern between the point in which AI is simply being
employed as a tool, contributing to human innovation, from the
point in which AI is actually being inherently innovative. While
autonomous AI systems resemble what is predicted as Artificial
General Intelligence (“AGI”) in the distant future, it is becoming
progressively evident that AGI could be on the near horizon. In the
instance of DABUS, an artificial intelligence device listed as the
sole inventor of multiple patent applications, AI is already capable
of independently generating inventions and internally appreciating
its creations as novel and useful. With current patent law requiring
that an inventor be a natural person, patents for AI-generated
inventions are at a stand-still. Without adequate patent protection
for AI-generated inventions, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office has inadvertently proscribed two avenues for
individuals to intelligently pick their poison. Either individuals will
be forced to fraudulently disclose themselves as the inventor instead
of indicating the true inventor, their AI system, or keep useful
innovation as a trade secret—both of which contradict the
fundamental underpinnings of the Intellectual Property Clause of
the Constitution. Thus, granting patent protection on novel,
AI-generated inventions is perhaps the best solution to encourage
creativity and progress science.

*
J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2022. The
Author would like to thank the N.C. JOLT editors and staff members for their
thorough feedback and assistance during the entirety of the editorial process.
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piece since its inception. The Author would also like to thank my parents for
their unconditional support throughout all her endeavors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“My dad thought the biggest problem in this world was
unrealized potential,”1 Liam tells Dolores in the premiere of the third

1

Westworld: Parce Domine (HBO television broadcast Mar. 15, 2020).
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season of HBO’s Westworld.2 For those who are not avid viewers of
the show, “Westworld” is a Western theme park populated by
human-like robots called “hosts.”3 In the show, wealthy humans pay
to visit the lawless park and indulge in their morally suppressed
fantasies, illuminating the darkest, most problematic sides of
humanity.4 The park’s attraction stems from the idea that the hosts
are almost indiscernible from humans, not only in their outward
appearances but also in the ways they harbor and express sentiment.5
To prevent the hosts from becoming too human-like, their neural
networks are erased each night, and they begin their
pre-programmed, character-based loops fresh the following day.6
But, as with most entertaining plots, unpredictability reigns, and the
creators of the hosts realize that perhaps these “robots” have
developed independent thoughts, aspirations, and sentiments despite
their initial programming.7 The show is based in the 2050s8—a mere
thirty years from now, but ironically, the themes echoed in
Westworld are already issues society faces today. With the
technological world advancing far more quickly than the law can set
precedent, adapting and harvesting its potential may seem difficult.
Yet, one of the ways to harvest technology’s potential is recognizing
that forms of Artificial Intelligence (“AI”), like humans, can create
novel inventions to which they are the sole inventor. However, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) disagrees.

2

Id.
Gabrielle Bruney, Here’s How Westworld’s Rohoboam Technology Put
Humanity on a Loop, ESQUIRE (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.esquire.com/
entertainment/tv/a31665341/rehoboam-westworld-season-3-explained/ [https://
perma.cc/X2QW-M8QN].
4
Westworld: Parce Domine, supra note 1.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Bruney, supra note 3.
8
Greg Braxton, This Season, ‘Westworld’ Imagines Los Angeles in 2058.
Here’s What it Looks Like, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://
www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/tv/story/2020-03-15/westworld-hbo-losangeles-blade-runner [https://perma.cc/Z4XB-MY26].
3
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In July 2019, Dr. Stephen Thaler, expert and pioneer in AI
technologies, filed two patent applications with the USPTO.9
However, Dr. Thaler claimed that his AI machine, “Device for
Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience” (“DABUS”),
autonomously, without human assistance, created two inventions:10
(1) a light beacon that mimics the human lacunar nerve impulses to
make light more noticeable in emergencies (“Neural Flame”), and
(2) a beverage container based on fractal geometry that enhances
gripping (“Fractal Container”).11 Patent applications usually require
an oath or declaration by the true inventor(s).12 However, because
the inventor in this instance was DABUS, which lacks a legal
personality and is incapable of executing an inventor’s oath, Dr.
Thaler filed a substitute statement identifying himself as the legal
representative of DABUS.13 Additionally, Dr. Thaler filed an
assignment document indicating himself as the assignee of the
inventions’ rights and interests.14 Regardless of how potentially
useful DABUS’s creations were, the USPTO issued a Notice stating
that both of Dr. Thaler’s applications failed to identify an inventor
by his or her legal name.15 In response, Dr. Thaler filed two
subsequent petitions requesting that the Notices be reviewed and
vacated; however, the USPTO denied both Dr. Thaler’s initial and
subsequent petitions.16 The USPTO published a final decision in
April 2020, stating that DABUS could not be named an inventor and
was ineligible for patent protection on its creative works.17

9
U.S. Patent Application No. US16/524,350 (filed July 29, 2019) [hereinafter
Decision on Petition].
10
Id. at 3–4.
11
Ryan Abbott, Patent Applications, THE ARTIFICIAL INVENTOR PROJECT (2020),
https://artificialinventor.com/patent-applications/ [https://perma.cc/R5NW-CAGZ].
12
35 U.S.C. § 115(b) (“An oath or declaration . . . shall contain statements that
. . . such individual believes himself or herself to be the original inventor or an
original joint inventor of a claimed invention in the application.”).
13
See 37 C.F.R. 1.64 (2019).
14
37 C.F.R. 3.73(c) (2019).
15
Decision on Petition, supra note 9, at 1–2.
16
Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 1.181 (2019).
17
Complaint at 8, Thaler v. Iancu, et al, No. 1:20-cv-00903 (E.D. Va. Aug 06,
2020) [hereinafter Complaint, Thaler v. Iancu].
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As a result of the USPTO’s decision, a new distinction arose,
which now turns on the amount of contribution an AI system is
attributed for a specific invention. In the past, AI systems have acted
as tools in assisting human inventorship.18 In these scenarios, the
final invention—regardless of whether AI contributed to ninety-nine
percent of the substantive product—is referred to as an AI-assisted
invention and is protected under current patent law.19 The protection
of AI-assisted inventions inevitably stems from the fact that only a
natural human is listed as the inventor(s).20 On the other hand,
AI-generated inventions, which could theoretically contribute to
100% of the final invention, and could meet all the other
patentability requirements, do not have patent protection because a
human inventor cannot be named.21 Thus, arguably, the difference
in patent protection could be the additional one percent in which AI
is no longer assisting human inventorship but being inherently
innovative. The issue with the USPTO making this slight, but
drastic, distinction is that all novel and valuable inventions created
solely by AI will go unprotected—at least for now.

18
Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future
of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1093 (2016).
19
E.g., USPTO, Artificial Intelligence: Opening Remarks | Overview of AI |
Patenting AI: Views Across the Corporate Spectrum, VBRICK REV at 01:11:0001:11:55 (Jan. 31, 2019), https://rev-vbrick.uspto.gov/#/videos/73b95f54-ca6e4ba5-9e95-a8b3a8aa60ea [https://perma.cc/G53G-6CXA]. See Erica Fraser,
Computers as Inventors - Legal and Policy Implications of Artificial Intelligence
on Patent Law, 13 SCRIPTED 305, 306 (2016) (describing that there is a vast
spectrum of computer involvement in the inventive process with one end
consisting of computers being used for simple calculations while the other
involves computers acting autonomously).
20
Decision on Petition, supra note 9, at 6.
21
See Benita Rose Matthew, Ryan Abbott Presenting on AI-Generated
Inventions at EmTech MENA, ARTIFICIAL INVENTOR at 00:04:08-00:04:49 (June
30, 2020), https://artificialinventor.com/ryan-abbott-presenting-on-ai-generatedinventions-at-emtech-mena-2/ [https://perma.cc/57YY-BKMA] (asserting that
even if an AI meets all the requirements of patentability, it cannot be an inventor
because it is not a natural person). “If I train my PhD student to solve complex
problems and she does, I’m not an inventor on her patents [and] I don’t have any
claim to having devised the final invention. So, if I just ask Siri to invent
something and it does, well, that would make Siri and inventor—at least it would
if Siri was a natural person.” Id.
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After the USPTO issued its final decision denying DABUS’s
inventions as patentable, Dr. Thaler filed suit in federal court against
the USPTO.22 In his complaint, Dr. Thaler argued that the USPTO’s
decision effectively prohibits patents on all AI-generated
inventions.23 Dr. Thaler further argued that “a patent application for
an AI-generated invention should not be rejected on the basis that
no natural person is identified as an inventor.”24 Furthermore, he
requested that his applications be reinstated and that the prior
decision on his petitions be vacated.25 Depending on the success of
Dr. Thaler’s claims, AI-generated inventions could still have the
potential to receive patent protection since the decisions of the
USPTO do not necessarily bind federal courts.26
Undoubtedly, current patent laws were structured during a time
in which AI-generated inventions were unimagined.27 Although
patent laws have been able to adapt along with technological
advancements, it is clear that patent laws are irreconcilable with the
sophistication of AI-generated inventions. Soon, they may also
become unable to accommodate further technological growth.28 By
denying recognition of DABUS as the sole inventor of its creative
works, the USPTO is excluding all AI-generated inventions and
ultimately setting a foundation that will restrict future innovation,
which may be the product of unanticipated technology. Thus, in
essence, the DABUS decision completely undermines the explicit
rationale of the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution.
This Article argues that AI should be recognized as an inventor.
Part II provides a brief discussion on the background of AI and the
emergence of DABUS. Part III explores current patent law
requirements and analyzes the USPTO’s decision denying
22

Complaint, Thaler v. Iancu, supra note 17, at 1.
Id. at 7.
24
Id. at 17.
25
Id. at 16–17.
26
Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 F. App’x
1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“While we greatly respect the PTO’s expertise on
all matters relating to patentability . . . we are not bound by its guidance.”).
27
Francesca Mazzi, Patentability of AI Generated Drugs, 4 EPLR 17, 17
(2020).
28
Id.
23
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DABUS’s inventorship recognition. Part IV discusses current
approaches to addressing AI inventorship. Part V describes why AI
should be recognized as an inventor. Part VI discusses potential
drawbacks to allowing AI inventorship. Lastly, Part VII concludes
that AI-generated inventions should be afforded patent protection
because AI inventorship ultimately preserves the patent system’s
moral integrity and promotes the progression of arts and sciences.
II. BACKGROUND: ARTIFICIAL INVENTION AND THE CREATION
OF DABUS
The AI industry has rapidly impacted nearly every sector of
modern life and contributes to humans’ life, liberty, and pursuit of
happiness.29 AI has gained recognition through publicized
exhibitions, including DeepMind’s “AlphaGo Master” beating the
world champion of the board game Go in 2017 and IBM’s “Watson”
winning a game of Jeopardy! in 2011.30 While these instances have
undoubtedly captivated a mesmerized audience, DeepMind and
IBM’s more impressive work has illuminated AI’s degree of social
utility.31 By the year 2027, experts predict that the AI industry will
be worth $733.7 billion in the United States—a growth rate of
42.2% from 2020’s report of $62.4 billion.32 While advertising and
29

USPTO, supra note 19, at 00:21:10-00:21:24 (explaining how AI affects
humans’ life (i.e., education, healthcare, law, and personal services), liberty (i.e.,
national security and law enforcement), and their pursuit of happiness (i.e.,
finance, transportation, communication, agriculture, marketing, and science and
technology)).
30
RYAN ABBOTT, THE REASONABLE ROBOT 1–2 (2020) (ebook).
31
For example, DeepMind’s AI is able to consistently predict development of
acute kidney failure forty-eight hours earlier than human physicians and Watson
can thoroughly analyze the genetics of cancer patients in about ten minutes, a task
that can take a team of health care experts roughly 160 hours to do. In fact, with
the ability to memorize dozens of medical books, hundreds of thousands of
articles, and an exorbitant amount of medical records, several companies claim
that their AI can already outdo human doctors in certain areas of the medical
profession. It is only a matter of time until AI can consistently prescribe the
best-suited prescriptions, perform diagnosis, and precisely replicate surgical
procedures. Id.
32
Artificial Intelligence Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report By
Solution (Hardware, Software, Services), By Technology (Deep Learning,
Machine Learning), By End Use, By Region, And Segment Forecasts, 2020–2027,
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media sectors accounted for most of the industry’s market in 2019,
sectors like healthcare, banking, and law are expected to dominate
the AI industry by 2027.33 In the pharmaceutical and medical
professions, some argue that AI is already doing ninety-nine percent
of the work required to develop drugs and vaccines.34 In the financial
industry, autonomous machines can execute complex transactions,
flag potential criminals using facial recognition software, and
perform extensive document reviewal.35 AI is also beginning to
drastically permeate the legal field by aiding criminal justice36 and
predicting litigation outcomes.37 In the form of “automated
lawyers,”38 AI is analyzing case law, assisting with discovery

GRAND VIEW RSCH (July 2020), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industryanalysis/artificial-intelligence-ai-market [https://perma.cc/X262-M2BC].
33
Id.
34
USPTO, supra note 19, at 01:10:55 (raising question of who the true inventor
really is when scientists and researchers initially design the specific screenings
for drugs, but then it is the millions of different compounds in which robots then
move into wells, stain, rinse, and analyze that results in a billion-dollar drug). But
see id. at 01:12:26 (stating that while humans’ offload most of the analysis piece
to computers, at the end of the day, a human has to tell the computer to do it).
35
Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligent Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 354
(2016).
36
Christopher Rigano, Using Artificial Intelligence to Address Criminal Justice
Needs, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Oct. 8, 2018), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/usingartificial-intelligence-address-criminal-justice-needs [https://perma.cc/CK6F-JSTR].
37
For a fascinating article discussing whether using predictive algorithms in the
U.S. criminal justice system makes the judicial process less biased, see Karen Hao
& Jonathan Stray, Can You Make AI Fairer Than a Judge? Play Our Courtroom
Algorithm
Game,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Oct.
17,
2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/10/17/75285/ai-fairer-than-judgecriminal-risk-assessment-algorithm/ [https://perma.cc/C75C-TGTC], and Julie
Sobowale, How Artificial Intelligence is Transforming the Legal Profession, ABA J.
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_artificial_
intelligence_is_transforming_the_legal_profession [https://perma.cc/42WH-AVPP]
(explaining an algorithm created at the Chicago-Kent College of Law which was
able to predict the outcomes of Supreme Court cases with 70% accuracy based on
an analysis of 7,700 rulings between 1953 and 2013).
38
Shlomit Ravid & Xiaoqiong Liu, When Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce
Inventions: An Alternative Model for Patent Law at the 3A Era, 39 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2215, 2219 (2018).
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processes, drafting trial briefs,39 and even appealing parking
tickets.40 These basic examples display a fraction of AI’s expansive
proficiencies, and even still, these instances illuminate AI’s capacity
to perform tasks autonomously. Thus, it seems counterintuitive that
the USPTO rejects AI’s ability to invent in a way analogous to
humans. Regardless of the USPTO’s outward rejection of AI as an
inventor, the USPTO has already granted AI inventors several
patents.41
Legal scholars speculate that the USPTO has been granting
patents for AI-generated inventions for decades.42 In those instances,
scholars and attorneys have suggested that the true AI inventor was
never disclosed, and a human was listed in its place.43 For example,
Dr. Thaler claimed that his first patent, the “Creativity Machine,”
actually generated his second patent44 even though he listed himself
as the inventor.45 The Creativity Machine is also credited with
numerous other inventions46 like the cross-bristle design of the
39

Rigano, supra note 36.
Leanna Garfield, A 19-Year-Old Made A Free Robot Lawyer That Has
Appealed $3 Million In Parking Tickets, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.businessinsider.com/joshua-browder-bot-for-parking-tickets-2016-2
[https://perma.cc/87PQ-C49L].
41
Abbott, I Think, supra note 18, at 1085; Kay Firth-Butterfield & Yoon Chae,
Artificial Intelligence Collides with Patent Law, WORLD ECON. FORUM, at 6 (Apr.
2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_48540_WP_End_of_Innovation_P
rotecting_Patent_Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP4X-Z32C].
42
Matthew, supra note 21, at 00:02:10-00:02:40.
43
ABBOTT, THE REASONABLE ROBOT, supra note 30, at 73 (explaining that Dr.
Thaler followed his attorney’s advice and did not list his Creativity Machine, his
first patent, as the inventor of his second patent, but if Dr. Thaler’s claims are true,
then the USPTO has granted a patent for an invention created by a nonhuman
inventor as early as 1988).
44
Dr. Thaler’s second patent is titled “Neural Network Based Prototyping
System and Method” and, also preceded DABUS. Id. at 73.
45
Id. (“As one of Thaler’s associates observed in response to the Creativity
Machine’s Patent, ‘Patent Number Two was invented by Patent Number One.
Think about that. Patent Number Two was invented by Patent Number One!’”).
46
For an excellent in-depth discussion with Dr. Thaler about the Creativity
Machine’s inventions and projects with the U.S. Air Force, Raytheon, and
Gillette, see generally Benita Rose Mathew, Dr. Thaler Speaks On How Dabus
Can Invent, ARTIFICIAL INVENTOR PROJECT (July 15, 2020),
https://artificialinventor.com/467-2/ [https://perma.cc/TS4A-7MWF] (sharing a
40
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Oral-B Cross Action Toothbrush or devices that search the internet
for messages from terrorists.47 Additionally, scientist John Koza48
claims that his AI, called the “Invention Machine,” autonomously
generated a system to make factories more efficient.49 Koza, like Dr.
Thaler, stated that his attorney advised his team to consider naming
themselves as the inventors on the patent applications “despite the
fact [that] ‘the whole invention was created by a computer.’”50
Consequently, the USPTO granted a patent to the “Invention
Machine’s” factory efficiency system while continuing to be utterly
oblivious to the actual inventor.51 Conceivably, these examples
represent a tiny fraction of the scientists who have faced the same
predicament: knowing their AI has autonomously generated a
patentable invention but being forced to list themselves as the
inventor to protect valuable subject-matter.52 While inventors may
use their name in place of AI amidst the glare of the USPTO,
creative minds have long understood the undeniable ability of
machines to engage in their autonomous abilities—ones that allow
them to flourish independent of human interaction.

discussion with Dr. Thaler, Ryan Abbott, and the American Intellectual Property
Law Association about the Creativity Machine’s past projects, how DABUS
functions, and the legal implications of AI-generated inventions).
47
Id. at 14:30.
48
ABBOTT, THE REASONABLE ROBOT, supra note 30, at 73–74. John Koza is a
computer scientist and pioneer in the field of genetic programming as well as the
inventor of the scratch-off lottery ticket. Id.
49
Id. at 74 (“The Invention Machine generated the content of the patent and an
improved controller (a common component of electrical products)[.] It did so
without a database of expert knowledge and without any knowledge about
existing controllers.”).
50
Id. at 74–75.
51
Id. at 73–75.
52
Id. Abbot explains that as early as 1983, AI program known as “Eurisko”
autonomously discovered new information through combining microchip
structures together to create several novel designs; however, Stanford University
abandoned filing a patent for “Eurisko’s” chip designs for unknown reasons. Id.
In addition, a computer program called “TED,” created by Alexander Kott in the
late 1980’s, “rediscovered at least two significant and well-known inventions and
also generated previously unknown and nontrivial designs.” Id.
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A. History of Invention Machines
Lady Lovelace, an English mathematician and daughter of Lord
Bryon, is considered one of the original computer programmers of
our “modern-day” generation.53 In 1843, she worked as Charles
Babbage’s accomplice in creating his proposed mechanical
general-purpose computer dubbed the “Analytical Engine.”54 In her
discussions about the Analytical Engine, Lady Lovelace iterated a
modernly accepted premise—computers are only capable of
producing desired outputs through a series of inputs.55 She stressed
that computers would never be able to originate anything on their
own.56
However, as history has inevitably shown,57 exclaiming the
forbidden “never” is a dangerous game. In the early 2000s, a team
of scientists, including Selmer Bringsjord and IBM’s “Watson”
developer, David Ferrucci, designed a test to determine whether a

53

PAMALA MCCORDUCK, MACHINES WHO THINK: A PERSONAL INQUIRY INTO
THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 32 (2004) (ebook).
54

Id.
Id. at 33 (“One statement of Lady Lovelace’s has often been quoted: ‘The
Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate anything. It can do
whatever we know how to order it to perform.’ And this statement has been
adduced as evidence that machines cannot, in any way, be said to think.”).
56
Id.
57
Id. at xix (“Those who said a thing could never be done were later replaced
by those who had to concede that it could, but then said it ought not to be.”);
AUGUST COMTE, THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY 148 (Harriet Martineau trans., 2000)
(1875) (explaining that humans would never know anything about the
composition of stars); 148 Cong. Rec. 23289 (2002) (statement of Bob Ingram
while speaking in the context of unknown consequences) (“And I’m inclined to
not predict such things unless I end up like Lord Kelvin, an English Scientist and
president of the Royal Society, who has gone down in history for saying: “Radio
has no future. Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible. X-rays will prove
to be a hoax. I have not the smallest molecule of faith in aerial navigation other
than ballooning.”); Samuel J. McNaughton, What Is Good Science, 13 NAT. RES.
& ENV’T. 513 (1999) (quoting Robert Milliken, Nobel Prize winner in physics,
who said in 1923: “There is no likelihood that man can ever tap the power of the
atom” and Charles H. Duell, director of the U.S. Patent Office, who said in 1899:
“Everything that can be invented has been invented.”). In all of these instances,
science and technology have proven these figures wrong. Id.
55
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computer can think like a human.58 Purportedly, the test more
accurately represents AI cognition than the previously renowned
“Turing Test,”59 named after British mathematician and logician
Alan Turing.60 Based on Lady Lovelace’s proposition that no form
of machine could ever think like a human, the “Lovelace Test” was
born.61 To “pass” the Lovelace Test, an artificial agent, designed by
a human, must: (1) originate a novel program, idea, piece of music,
etc., that it was not engineered to produce, and (2) the agent’s
designers must not be able to explain how the original code led to
the novel idea.62 The irony of scientists like Selmer Bringsjord and
David Ferrucci naming their AI cognition test after Lady Lovelace
illustrates, in and of itself, the danger of using the word “never,”
especially in the realm of technology.63 In the instance of DABUS,
one could say, “Houston, we have a problem,”64 because it seems
58

Jordan Pearson, Forget Turing, the Lovelace Test Has a Better Shot at
Spotting AI, VICE (July 8, 2014, 2:30 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/
article/pgaany/forget-turing-the-lovelace-test-has-a-better-shot-at-spotting-ai
[https://perma.cc/CP32-CN5J]. See generally Selmer Bringsjord et al., Creativity,
the Turing Test, and the (Better) Lovelace Test, 11 MINDS AND MACHS., 1, 3–22
(2001) (explaining the Lovelace Test in depth and what differentiates it from the
Turing Test).
59
MCCORDUCK, supra note 53, at 262.
60
John R. KOZA, Human-Competitive Results Produced by Genetic
Programming, 11 GENETIC PROGRAMMING & EVOLVABLE MACHS. 251, 252
(2010) (“Turing correctly perceived in 1948 and 1950 that machine intelligence
might be achieved by an evolutionary process [similar to a child] in which a
description of a computer program (the hereditary material) undergoes
progressive modification (mutation) under the guidance of natural selection (i.e.,
selective pressure in the form of what is today usually called ‘fitness’ by
practitioners of genetic and evolutionary computation.”). MCCORDUCK, supra
note 53, at 65 (explaining Alan Turing’s computer design is regarded as the push
behind cracking German cipher machine, “Enigma,” stating “‘I won’t say that
what Turing did made us win the war,’ says I. J. Good, now a professor at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, who was then Turing’s statistical clerk, ‘but I daresay we
might have lost it without him.’”).
61
Bringsjord et al., supra note 58, at 2 (emphasis added).
62
Pearson, supra note 58.
63
See MCCORDUCK, supra note 53, at xix.
64
Michael S. Rosenwald, ‘Houston, We Have a Problem’: The Amazing
History of the Iconic Apollo 13 Misquote, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/04/13/houston-we-
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like this dangerous game has, yet again, played out quite
predictably.
Dr. Thaler proposed that DABUS has accomplished the
“impossible” by passing the Lovelace Test.65 DABUS has not only
autonomously generated two novel inventions, but it has also
independently appreciated them as novel.66 Furthermore, Dr. Thaler
claims that while he generally understands the process in which
DABUS creates, he cannot explain the exact “ah-hah!” moment that
leads DABUS to conceptualize and solidify its novel inventions.67
By no means does Dr. Thaler purport DABUS to be exactly
human-like; instead, he proposes that the manner in which DABUS
conceptualizes spaces and ideas proves reminiscent of human
cognition, consciousness, and sentience.68
B. Emergence of DABUS
DABUS is a type of creative-machine; however, DABUS
functions entirely differently than Dr. Thaler’s earlier patented
Creativity Machine.69 The Creativity Machine requires at least two
neural networks (“nets”): (1) an idea generator net and (2) a critic
net.70 The two nets are permanently connected in a
quasi-brainstorming session where the critic net “judges” what the
generator net generates and “steers” its artificial ideation in the
have-a-problem-the-amazing-history-of-the-iconic-apollo-13-misquote/
[https://perma.cc/VT5P-SF8S].
65
Perpetual Motion Podcast, Are All Inventors Humans?, IHEARTRADIO, at
37:00 (July 8, 2020), https://www.iheart.com/podcast/966-perpetual-motionpodcast-69966811/episode/are-all-inventors-human-episode-69976714/
[https://perma.cc/5J7D-LH98] (explaining that the Turing Test is not an accurate
representation if AI can “think,” instead, the more impressive test is the Lovelace
Test and the only reason why critics say that an AI has never passed it is to “keep
others out”).
66
Id. at 18:47 (emphasis added).
67
Id. (explaining that pigeon language is how humans think as well and it is not
until our brain chooses to be eloquent and polite that we appear to be intelligent
with the rearrangement of our thoughts in the form of grammatical sentences).
68
Id. at 34:55.
69
What is DABUS?, IMAGINATION ENGINES, INC. (last visited Nov. 1, 2020),
http://imagination-engines.com/iei_dabus.php [https://perma.cc/Z7QQ-XFXV].
70
Id.
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direction of useful, novel, or valuable notions.71 After the critic
“approves” of an idea, it reinforces that idea within both neural nets
to create superior ideas.72 While the Creativity Machine performs
parametric optimizations (i.e., it has parameters to what it can
generate), DABUS lacks a “critic net,”73 consequently creating a
greater latitude for conceptualization.74 DABUS autonomously
combines simple concepts into more complex ones that, in turn,
launch a series of memories and express the anticipated
consequences of those memories or ideas.75 DABUS’s ideas are not
represented by the “on-off” patterns of neuron activations like the
Creativity Machine but by “ephemeral structures or shapes formed
by chains of nets that are rapidly materializing and
dematerializing.”76 If randomly one of these “geometrically
represented ideas incorporates one or more desirable outcomes,”
DABUS reinforces the desirable patterns.77 In contrast, patterns
representing undesirable notions are “weakened through a variety of
induced chaotic noise.”78
The underlying difference between DABUS’s structure and
other common forms of AI is that DABUS is not directed what to
invent.79 When DABUS discovers a new concept chain, its internal
networks appreciate the concept’s novelty.80 To communicate its
appreciation of a novel concept chain, DABUS rings these “bells”
to alert Dr. Thaler of the idea.81 DABUS can then convey its specific,
novel idea to Dr. Thaler through images flashed upon a screen or
through text in the form of pidgin language.82 Even though DABUS
71

Id.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Perpetual Motion Podcast, supra note 65, at 18:47.
82
Id. at 19:07. Dr. Thaler describes DABUS’s pidgin language as a primitive
form of communication, not something that is “necessarily grammatical or
beautiful.” Id. However, Dr. Thaler explains that “humans think in this way too
72
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primarily functions without a directional course, Dr. Thaler can also
confine its knowledge to be within specific conceptual spaces, such
as medical information, so DABUS will concentrate its thinking
within that conceptual space to solve a particular problem dealing
with medical information.83
DABUS’s conceptualization processes can be equated to human
stream of consciousness.84 Human brains have subliminal
conceptualization going on at all times. However, unlike machines,
humans’ potentially novel ideas are suppressed because daily tasks
and rudimentary thoughts take priority.85 Thus, what could have
been an extraordinary concept may never resurface in a human
mind.86 Regardless of how similar DABUS’s neural processes are to
a human’s cognition, one significant barrier stands in the way of
inventorship eligibility—DABUS is not a natural person.
III. CURRENT PATENT LAW REQUIREMENTS AND USPTO’S
DABUS DECISION
The USPTO focused on two underlying rationales when denying
Dr. Thaler’s final petition listing DABUS as the sole inventor of its
creations.87 The USPTO determined that an inventor must be a
natural person, and because DABUS is not a natural person, it
cannot be capable of “conception,” which is commonly referred to
as the “touchstone of inventorship.”88 In making its conclusion, the
USPTO relied heavily on the plain meaning of current patent law
before we decide to be polite or appear somewhat intelligent” by rearranging our
thoughts into congruent sentences. Id. For instance, Dr. Thaler explains pidgin
language as something like: “Me Tarzan, you Jane; Silver bird fly over mountain.”
Id.
83
Id. at 26:37 (explaining that DABUS can limit its conceptual space, but that
is more of a task for the Creativity Machine).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 25:10.
87
See Decision on Petition, supra note 9, at 3–7.
88
Id. at 5–7 (citations omitted) (“While these Federal Circuit decisions are in
the context of states and corporations, respectively, the discussion of conception
as being a ‘formation in the mind of the inventor’ and a ‘mental act’ is equally
applicable to machines and indicates that conception—the touchstone of
inventorship—must be performed by a natural person.”).
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found in Title 35 of the United States Code (“Patent Act”) and the
case law interpreting it.89 Thus, the USPTO effectively conducted a
dualistic analysis, qualifying DABUS’s inventorship status based
on: (A) a discussion of its existence as an inventor and (B) its
resulting inability to be capable of conception.
A. “Inventor”
The USPTO employed two methods in excluding DABUS from
the term “inventor”—both of which are flawed. The USPTO first
relied on specific terms in various sections of the Patent Act to
justify that DABUS cannot be an inventor because DABUS is not
an “individual” and an “individual” must be a “natural person.”90
The USPTO pointed towards § 100(f) of the Patent Act: “The term
‘inventor’ means the individual, or if joint invention, the individuals
collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the
invention.”91 Since the Patent Act itself does not define the term
“individual,” the UPSTO’s first flaw was rationalizing that
“individual” means a “natural person” by pointing to other terms in
the Patent Act like “whoever” and “person.”92 In crafting a definition
for the word “individual” to mean “natural person,” the USPTO
asserted that § 101 clarifies any ambiguity by stating: “Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”93 Citing the dictionary, the
USPTO stated that the plain meaning of “individual” accompanied
by the term “whoever” illustrated that an inventor must be a “natural
person.”94 Additionally, the USPTO stressed that § 115 of the Patent

89

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
91
Id. at 3 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 100(f) (2012)) (emphasis added).
92
Id.
93
Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (alteration in USPTO decision) (emphasis
added).
94
Id. at 3 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2001)).
90
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Act, which covers inventors’ oaths and declarations before receiving
a patent, must be done by a “person.”95
Although the USPTO pointed towards words in the Patent Act
like “whoever,”96 “individual,”97 and “person”98 to ultimately
exclude AI from being an inventor, the decision did little to clarify
these terms’ meanings other than stressing the words’ common
connotations. The issue with the USPTO using “[w]hoever” from
§ 101 to indicate that an individual must mean a natural person is
that “the word[ ] ‘whoever’ include[s] corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, [and] societies.”99 Furthermore,
under current U.S. patent laws, “the term person includes both
individuals and corporations.”100 Thus, using “whoever” and
“person” to indicate that an “individual,” as referenced in § 101
defining who can be an inventor, means “natural person” is
inconsistent. While terms like “whoever” and “person” do not
explicitly include AI, these terms are associated with entities that are
not natural humans. For the USPTO to state that DABUS is
excluded from being an inventor because DABUS is not an
“individual” (i.e., “natural person”), and then to support that
assertion by using words that do not always mean “natural person”
is heavily flawed.
Furthermore, depending on the emphasis of commas,
“whoever,” found in § 101, could instead reference the list of “new
and useful process[es].”101 Namely, “whoever”—meaning
“machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof”—“may obtain a patent.”102 In other
words, DABUS is a machine and, is itself, a useful improvement
that may obtain a patent. Thus, the USPTO’s interpretation of
“inventor” and what can be one demonstrates that patent law, in the
95

Id. at 6 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2012)).
Id. at 4 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
97
Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2012)).
98
Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 115(h)(1) (2012)).
99
1 U.S.C. § 1.
100
GREGORY A. STOBBS, BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS § 19.07 (2nd Edition,
2011).
101
35 U.S.C. § 101.
102
Id.
96
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realm of AI, is not as black and white as the USPTO indicates it to
be.
The second major flaw in the USPTO’s reasoning for rejecting
DABUS as an inventor was equating AI to corporations. Drawing
on case law defining who can be an inventor, the USPTO reasoned
that since corporations cannot be an inventor, it follows that AI
cannot be one either.103 However, AI, as an inventor, is not
synonymous with corporations. A historical rationale behind
rejecting corporations as inventors is rooted in protecting human
inventors’ moral rights from the powers of large corporations.104
Since corporations file most patents, early patent law strived to
recognize the individuals who truly worked on the patent and
contributed to its conception.105 Thus, if an individual were to invent
something while employed at a corporation, the title would still go
to the creator, not the company.
Moreover, another rationale for rejecting corporations as
inventors rests in property law—more precisely, that the title to the
invention should vest initially in the intellectual creator of the
work.106 As a practical matter, this makes sense because corporations
are often comprised of numerous people and deeming one inventor,
or numerous co-inventors, in a hierarchical corporation poses
underlying integrity issues.107 In other words, it could lead to a
higher-ranked employer manipulating and taking credit for a newer,
lower-ranked associate’s creation.108

103

Decision on Petition, supra note 9, at 4–5 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
104
Matthew, supra note 21, at 00:05:35-00:06:07.
105
Id.
106
See, e.g., Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583, 602 (1868) (“He is
the inventor and is entitled to the patent who first brought the machine to
perfection and made it capable of useful operation . . . No one is entitled to a patent
for that which he did not invent unless he can show a legal title to the same from
the inventor or by operation of law.”).
107
Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 2233.
108
See Matthew, supra note 21, at 00:05:35–00:06:07.
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B. “Conception”
In addition to the USPTO rejecting DABUS as an inventor
because AI is not a natural person, the USPTO also found that
DABUS was incapable of “conception.”109 Conception is often
referred to as the “touchstone of inventorship, the completion of the
mental part of invention,” and the USPTO emphasized that this
“touchstone” is reserved for natural persons.110 While some Federal
Circuit decisions connote that conception is a whimsical process
occurring only in the “minds” of inventors,111 “the descriptions are
not particularly informative about what is specifically required.”112
In addition to relying on case law comparing corporations to
DABUS to reject DABUS as an “inventor,” the USPTO also
referenced case law concerning corporations to reject DABUS’s
ability of “conception.”113 The USPTO’s decision relied on case law
pertaining to corporations to explain that conception is “the
formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent
idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be
applied in practice.”114 However, the underlying legality of why
corporations cannot be “inventors” or perform “conception” is
entirely different and arguably incompatible with the instance of
DABUS. Since DABUS, and other forms of AI, can imitate a human
brain’s neural workings, it is unclear what “formation in the mind”
actually means when applied to AI.115 The USPTO’s attachment of
such weight to an ambiguous phrase—“formation in the mind”—in
concluding that AI cannot conceive is quite troublesome, in part
because minds, while often associated with human brains, consist of
the same internal structures as AI-neural networks.116 Furthermore,
the Patent Act provides that patentability “shall not be negated by
109

Decision on Petition, supra note 9, at 5.
Id. at 5 (citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223
(Fed. Cir. 1994)) (“To perform this mental act, inventors must be natural persons
and cannot be corporations or sovereigns.”).
111
E.g., Burroughs Wellcome Co., 40 F.3d at 1230 (“[C]onception occurs in the
inventors’ minds, not on paper.”).
112
Complaint, Thaler v. Iancu, supra note 17, at 13.
113
Decision on Petition, supra note 9, at 5.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Perpetual Motion Podcast, supra note 65, 20:03.
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the manner in which the invention was made.”117 This phrase is
directly at odds with the USPTO’s analysis on the intricacies of
conception and its explanation of why DABUS cannot perform this
integral step of inventorship.
****
The DABUS decision illustrates how patent law, in relation to
AI-generated inventions, creates a fallacy in reasoning. The USPTO
employed a cyclical and fallacious “begging the question” rationale
when interpreting terms like “inventor” and “conception” to
ultimately exclude AI.118 This type of fallacy is commonly known as
a petitio principii.119 These fallacies “assume the conclusion of the
argument offered and take the proposition for which they are
arguing to use it as a premise in the argument.”120 Since technically
this type of argument is valid, the petitio principii usually goes
uncontested.121 The fallacy exemplifies that any proposition
logically follows from itself, so certainly, when a premise is
propositionally identical to the conclusion, the premise is relevant
to the conclusion. Thus, the issue with a petitio principii argument
is that “it is no argument at all, other than the degenerate form of ‘p,
therefore p.’”122

117

35 U.S.C. § 103.
See Kevin W. Saunders, Informal Fallacies in Argumentation, 44 S.C.L.
REV. 343, 357 (1993).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 358. See also Alex Kozinski, The Virtues of an Ordered Mind; After
Hours; Books, Arts, Leisure, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 27, 1989, at 3 (1989)
(“Discussing the legal fallacy, petitio principii, [Judge Aldisert] laments [t]his
fallacy is really a first-class rascal because it sneaks up on us so often. He
continues: The rascal bears many names . . . arguing in a circle, circular reasoning,
putting the bunny in the hat, failing to prove the original proposition asserted, and
using the original premise as proof of itself. Indeed, I can’t count how often I’ve
caught lawyers putting the bunny in the hat.”).
122
Saunders, supra note 118, at 358 (explaining how in many of Judge
Aldisert’s dissents he criticizes the majority of using this type of informal fallacy).
See also United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 622 (3d Cir. 1982) (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting) (“Instead of proving the conclusion . . . the argument assumes it and
then argues substantive law.”).
118
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Here, the USPTO rationalized that DABUS cannot be an
inventor because (1) “inventor” means “individual” and
(2) “individual” points towards being a “natural person;” thus,
(3) only a “natural person” can be an “inventor.”123 Continuing the
circle, the USPTO further rationalized that since (1) “conception” is
a process that happens only in the “mind,” and (2) only “natural
persons” have “minds,” then (3) DABUS cannot possibly be capable
of “conception” because it is reserved for “individuals,” and (4) only
“individuals” can be “inventors.” Regardless of where one begins in
the circle of reasoning, the conclusion is the same. And based on
current patent laws, there is virtually no way around it.
Furthermore, the USPTO employed a “traditional appeal” type
of reasoning when there was no tradition to appeal to in supporting
the exclusion of AI as an inventor.124 Indeed, before the DABUS
decision, there was no relevant Patent Office policy directly on the
subject of AI-generated inventions.125 Even still, there is no statute
addressing computational invention or federal case law directly on
the issue.126 Thus, in essence, the USPTO’s decision displays that
current patent law is radically unequipped to deal with technological
advancements in the field of AI.

123

See infra Part IV(B).
This type of argument usually presents itself in times of unaccepted, social
change. While this Article, in no way, intends to analogize the sacred importance
of the institution of marriage to all sexualities to the topic of AI invention, it aims
to draw attention to the pattern of rationale courts use when denying progress
when it does not seem to “fit” the times. See Kitchen v. Hubert, 755 F.3d 1193,
1216 (2014) (“To claim that marriage, by definition, excludes certain couples is
simply to insist that those couples may not marry because they have historically
been denied the right to do so. One might just as easily have argued that interracial
couples are by definition excluded from the institution of marriage.”); John Locke,
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), http://enlightenment.
supersaturated.com/johnlocke/preamble.html [https://perma.cc/2TXB-LTHC] (“[N]ew
opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason but
because they are not already common.”).
125
Abbott, I Think, supra note 18, at 1080.
126
Id.
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IV. APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING AI INVENTORSHIP
After the USPTO released a request for comments on how best
to fit AI within inventorship and patentability, there seemed to be an
underlying consensus that the USPTO should revisit these issues
when machines approach AGI.127 AGI is considered a type of
intelligence analogous to that possessed by humankind that could
“theoretical[ly] . . . arise in a distant future.”128 However, this
approach is problematic for two reasons. First, if AI were to be only
recognized as an inventor when it becomes AGI, then there will
inevitably be an exponential, and perhaps heedless, race to meet
those means.129 Allowing AI to be regarded as an inventor now
would arguably slow some efforts to make computers even more
human-like—a concern held by many.130 Second, while predictions

127
USPTO, PUBLIC VIEWS ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY POLICY 6 (Oct. 2020), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/USPTO_AI-Report_2020-10-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LXU-GKXP].
128
Id. at ii.
129
See discussion of “Lovelace Test,” supra Part II(A). Regardless of how
interesting it is that AI could pass a test designed only to be conquered by human
intelligence, AI cognition tests do not seem especially useful other than to provide
AI supporters and critics a basis for their respective arguments about whether AI
has the ability to think like a human. Since one of the main barriers of AI being
ineligible for inventorship status is the fact that it is not human, then perhaps one
of the underlying forces in creating cognition tests is to prove just how similar AI
can get to humankind. The danger of creating these tests is that inevitably,
humans, as goal-oriented creatures, will want their AI machines to “pass” them
which leads to another group of scientists getting together and forming yet another
“impossible” standard. The fact that AI cannot currently be said to exactly imitate
a human mind should be irrelevant in the realm of patent law. Even if the courts
refuse to recognize AI as inventors, it probably will not stop humans from trying
to replicate human consciousness, cognition, and sentience in the form of a
machine. Id.; ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER 17 (2012) (“If you go slowly, you
risk getting sunstroke. But if you go too fast, you work up a sweat and then catch
a chill inside the church.”) In other words, there is no right answer, but the USPTO
needs to pick its poison.
130
Id.
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range from ten years131 to centuries132 as to when AGI will be
achieved,133 the issues that AGI presents will undoubtedly require
decades to ameliorate and will cause tremendous chaos if not
addressed prior to the fact. However, these dates are simply
predictions, and with AI progressing at such a rapid rate, predictions
may be futile. Issuing AI-generated patents to AI inventors in the
present could curtail some of these issues and force the USPTO and
patent scholars to embark on the daunting task of analyzing where
AI should fit within Title 35 without ultimately excluding it.
Undoubtedly, officially recognizing the extent of AI’s presence in
the patent realm is an issue best suited for Congress; thus, it would
be in the USPTO’s best interest to begin preparing and proposing
solutions now. If the issues are not addressed in the near future, a
rise in lawsuits is inevitable now that AI-generated inventions are
on the USPTO’s radar. Obtaining a patent is exceptionally costly
already.134 Furthermore, going through an appeal process is frankly
unfeasible for most applicants.135
Based on the individuals, companies, and associations that
responded to the USPTO’s request for comments,136 three routes
131
Naveen Joshi, How Far Are We From Achieving Artificial General
Intelligence?, FORBES (June 10, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
cognitiveworld/2019/06/10/how-far-are-we-from-achieving-artificial-generalintelligence/#2fab82216dc4 [https://perma.cc/8X2D-2UEY].
132
James Vincent, This is When AI’s Top Researchers Think Artificial General
Intelligence Will be Achieved, THE VERGE (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.
theverge.com/2018/11/27/18114362/ai-artificial-general-intelligence-whenachieved-martin-ford-book [https://perma.cc/WDE4-R97C].
133
It is possible that AGI has already been achieved, but it is being kept as a
trade secret. USPTO, supra note 19.
134
See A. Abbott, et al., Crippling the Innovation Economy: Regulatory
Overreach at the Patent Office, REGUL. TRANSPARENCY PROJECT OF THE
FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Aug. 14, 2017), https://regproject.org/paper/cripplinginnovation-economy-regulatory-overreach-patent-office/ [https://perma.cc/UFQ8RAK6] (explaining people commonly spend roughly $30,000 to $60,000 in filing
costs and attorney’s fees by the time the process of application to issuance is
finished).
135
Id. at n. 34 (indicating that based on a report conducted by the American
Intellectual Property Association in 2015 the median cost of traditional patent
litigation to trial was $3.1 million).
136
See generally Request for Comments on Patenting Artificial Intelligence
Inventions, 84 Fed. Reg. 44889 (Aug. 27, 2019) (requesting comments to gather
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could be followed to address AI in patent law. The first is continuing
to abide by current standards and thus neglecting to grant
inventorship status to AI. The second approach is AI being listed as
a co-inventor. Finally, the third approach is allowing AI to be the
sole inventor of its creative works. Notably, none of these
suggestions recommend that AI have ownership rights, nor does this
Article argue such a proposition.
A. Continue Current Standards and Reject AI as an Inventor
The first recommendation would prevent AI from gaining
inventorship status in any capacity, but it would continue to allow
AI as a tool contributing to human inventorship, namely, to assist in
conception and reduction to practice. However, this solution hinders
efforts to preserve the patent system’s moral, economic, and
intellectual integrity and ultimately inhibits collaboration. This
route would promote fraudulent activity by prompting people to
name themselves as an inventor regardless of their absent role in the
process as required for inventorship in 35 U.S.C § 115.137 Also, this
route would perpetuate companies or individuals leveraging the
option of keeping AI-generated inventions as trade secrets.138 Yet,
for companies or even smaller private groups, trade secrets do not
always provide adequate protection due to the fluctuation of
employees and the difficulty of actually keeping information
secret.139 In addition, keeping AI-generated inventions as trade
secrets does not prevent competitors from independently coming by
“information on patent related issues regarding artificial intelligence inventions
for purposes of evaluating whether further examination guidance is needed to
promote the reliability and predictability of patenting artificial intelligence
inventions.”).
137
See 35 U.S.C. § 115(b) (“An oath or declaration under subsection (a) shall
contain statements that . . . such individual believes himself or herself to be the
original inventor or an original joint inventor of a claimed invention in the
application.”).
138
USPTO, supra note 19, at 01:15:10 (explaining that when choosing whether
to pursue keeping information as a trade secret or pursing a patent, it is important
to ask what the duration of the innovation may be—if it is something that can be
replicated by a competitor tomorrow, then pursing a patent would be ideal,
however if it is something that is before its time, keeping it as a trade secret may
be advantageous).
139
Id. at 01:16:21–01:16:40.
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the same invention, even by means other than reverse-engineering,
and then filing a patent with a human as an inventor.140 Most
importantly, trade secrets inherently inhibit transparency and
collaboration. Especially with the development of AI, a field where
the dissemination of information notably serves as a framework for
future AI, companies and individuals should be incentivized to
patent their AI-generated inventions to encourage collaboration and
contribute to the public domain.
B. Hybrid Approach: Listing AI & its Human Owner as Co-Inventors
A second recommendation would be more of a middle-ground
solution. Its premise is changing current patent law so that AI can
be listed as a co-inventor. Classic AI, or “Good Old-Fashioned AI”
(“GOFAI”) as philosopher John Haugeland called it, follows a
model in which a machine processes input data according to an
encoded model of a problem and then outputs a solution.141 While
GOFAI is what the USPTO typically deals with, it now represents
the far left of the AI capability spectrum. In contrast, DABUS’s
capabilities illustrate the far-right—or, more appropriately, the
current far-right. Thus, allowing AI to be listed under its owner as a
co-author would give it some sort of credit. However, this also
presents an issue. The process of distinguishing who is and is not a
co-author is already daunting,142 and throwing AI into the midst
would further complicate this distinction.
C. Recognize AI as Sole Inventor with Human Owning Patent
The essence of this Article proposes the third and most
appropriate recommendation. The best way to address AI in the
patent realm is to name the AI as the patent’s inventor and assign
the property rights to the AI’s owner. This would provide the most
clear-cut solution and would remain consistent with the
Constitution. From a purely economic and utilitarian perspective, if
AI can conceive an invention that promotes innovation, then it
140

Id. at 01:16:42–01:17:12.
RYAN ABBOTT, THE REASONABLE ROBOT, supra note 30, at 28.
142
Letter from Thomas J. Brindisi, to Laura A Peter, Deputy under Sec’y of
Com. (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Thomas-Brindisi_RFC-84-FR-44889.pdf. [https://perma.cc/E2LL-P4YN].
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should be recognized.143 There are two ways to potentially address
the speculated harm to human inventors that would be caused by
allowing AI inventors. One could be to limit the patent term of
AI-generated inventions. Another could be restricting AI-generated
patents to areas that promote social justice, public education, the
environment, or something beneficial to all humankind.
V. WHY PATENT LAW SHOULD RECOGNIZE AI AS AN
INVENTOR
AI inventorship exemplifies the type of creativity and social
utility the Framers intended to harvest through the Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution.144 DABUS illustrates that AI
can autonomously conceive an invention that is novel and useful,
and if DABUS was a natural person, it is likely that its inventions
would have been granted patent protection. While critics may
perceive AI as only capable of producing specifically defined
outputs, DABUS has shown that its creation process is akin to
humans. Creativity is not hanging out in vacuums145—it is a
bootstrapping process that requires mentorship from parents,
professors, and institutions to the point where enterprise, analogies,
and associative memories are gained and eventually harvested into
creativity.146 Counterintuitively, Dr. Thaler argues that AI is truly the
only entity that is capable of genuine creativity.147 To varying
143

USPTO, supra note 19, at 01:13:00.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
145
See DAVID BROOKS, THE ROAD TO CHARACTER 115–16 (2015) (explaining
everyone’s ideas are a product of the institutions that shape them, and in turn,
affect the way they see and think critically about the world). “A person not born
into an open field and a blank social slate. A person is born into a collection of
permanent institutions.” Id.
146
Perpetual Motion Podcast, supra note 65, at 43:50. See Matthew, supra note
21, at 00:04:08–00:04:49 (explaining the dichotomy of the patent system’s
requirements of inventorship: if a professor were to teach their PhD student how
to think, the professor would not qualify as an inventor of the PhD student’s
creative works, but in contrast, if a professor were to teach its AI system how to
solve problems, then the professor would most likely be the legal inventor of an
AI’s invention).
147
E.g., id. at 44:40 (asking Dr. Thaler whether he believes that humans can
actually invent anything, Dr. Thaler remarks: “Yes and no. But, mostly no. The
invention process actually involves humans going temporarily insane—
144
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degrees in different contexts, the creative process has always been
collaborative and cumulative, involving reworking of existing
materials and meanings rather than originating completely new
ones.148 It has never entailed a sharp distinction between imitating,
borrowing or adapting, and creating new, original ideas.149
Consequently, AI should be recognized as the legal inventor of its
autonomous creations because: (A) AI inventorship is consistent
with the Framers intent behind proposing the Intellectual Property
Clause, (B) AI inventorship preserves the moral integrity of the
patent system by promoting the accurate disclosure of information,
and (C) AI inventorship efficiently progresses the arts and sciences.
A. AI as an Inventor is Consistent with the Constitution
Like any proposal made almost 300 years ago, the actual records
indicating the intent behind the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution150 (“The Clause”) prove to be highly sparse.151
Nonetheless, the lack of evidence has not stopped courts and
scholars from reaching and assigning meaning where they see fit.152
hallucinating things that have not directly experienced before. It’s a mild form of
insanity that goes about and it can go the entire route [which] can result in
hospitalization.”). Dr. Thaler also points out the correlation between genius and
insanity. Id. But, since humanity is suppressed by social expectations and selfhelp books, it would be dangerous for humans to reach the type of “insanity” that
leads to great invention. Id. However, it is advantageous if humans can reach this
type of “dangerous” creativity vicariously through a machine. Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
151
Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57
UCLA L. REV. 421, 423 (2009); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the
Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP.
L 1, 26 (1994) (“[T]he question naturally arises as to how the Intellectual Property
Clause came to be included in the Constitution. Little has been written on the
point. The reason for the dearth of commentary undoubtedly is that so little is
actually known about how its inclusion came about.”).
152
See Oliar, supra note 151, at 424 (“The little we currently know about the
Clause’s framing is the result of a host of factors, some objective-relating to the
(small) amount and (confused) nature of the relevant historical material that
survived the Convention-and some interpretive-relating to the way in which
scholars (mis)understood this material and the (little) significance they gave it.”);
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In fact, some scholars argue that the only primary, credible records
are two handwritten journals: James Madison’s personal journal and
the Convention’s Journal.153 Even though the history and purpose
behind The Clause can represent somewhat of a dichotomy in the
realm of AI-generated inventions, it is imperative to understand the
context in which The Clause was implemented.
As products of the Enlightenment Era, the Founding Fathers
understood that the establishment of communication links was
implicit in building a new democratic nation, a cohesive market, and
a shared culture.154 Departing from the negative connotation
European monarchs assigned to the widespread dissemination of
information, the Framers believed, inter alia, that exchanging
information was essential to form a stronger nation.155 Thus, James
Madison and Charles Pinckney “each put forth proposals to include
among Congress’ powers the right to grant intellectual property
rights”—each aimed at advancing the state of science and
learning.156 The Clause reflected the Founding Fathers’ belief that
intellectual property rights were not natural rights, but instead
statutory rights granted to induce the progression of learning.157 The
Clause was “unanimously approved without discussion,”158 and in
Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of
Deference, 47 J. COPY. SOC’Y U.S.A. 317, 320 (2000) (indicating that “the history
of the drafting of the Clause left little for the courts to employ”); Michael D.
Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3,
33 (2001) (“Historians of American copyright law do not know much about the
making of the constitutional clause, and most of what we have is historical
interpretation, or at times, speculation.”).
153
See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, The Origins and Meaning Of The Intellectual
Property Clause 1, 5 (2004) (on file with Harvard Law School),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/ip/oliar_ipclause.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMX4-ND42].
154
U.S. CONG. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-302, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 37 (1986).
155
Id.
156
Id. at 37–38.
157
Id. at 37; Adam Mossoff, Who Cares what Thomas Jefferson Thought About
Patents – Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL
L. REV. 953, 963–65 (2007) (explaining that scholars often point towards the
infamous 1813 letter from Thomas Jefferson to Iaasac McPherson to support that
Jefferson was against the idea that patent protection was a natural right).
158
U.S. CONG. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 154, at 37.
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its final glory, The Clause granted Congress the enumerated power
“[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.”159
Even in modern times, The Clause provides an explicit rationale
for encouraging innovation through patent and copyright protection:
“To promote the progress of science and useful arts.”160 Notably,
The Clause establishes an incentive theory by granting “authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries” for “limited times.”161 In essence, inventors will be
more motivated to invent if they can receive government-sanctioned
monopolies to exploit commercial embodiments of their
inventions—thus, promoting the progress of science.162
Consequently, receiving exclusive rights to own and sell an
invention can be tremendously lucrative, which, in turn, incentivizes
new inventions and discoveries by compensating the time, effort,
and unique creativity required to create a useful and novel
invention.163
Given the context in which the Framers proposed the Clause and
its social utility in modern culture, allowing AI inventorship would
seem consistent with the Constitution. However, critics argue that
deeming AI as an inventor would infringe on the basic notion of
patents’ association with ownership, thus contradicting the Framers’
intent of allowing human inventors to own the fruits of their labor.164
While this argument is not without merit, it negligently blurs the
159

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id. See Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 2236 (“Discourse concerning the
theoretical justifications for intellectual property tends to focus on three main
substantive theories: (1) law-and-economics theory, a utilitarian approach that
examines intellectual property rules according to their cumulative efficiency and
ability to promote total welfare; (2) personality theory, which focuses on the
personality of the creators and inventors; and (3) Lockean labor theory, which
justifies the property interest as the fruits of the creator’s labor.”).
161
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
162
Abbott, I Think, supra note 18, at 1080.
163
Id.
164
Samuel Scholz, A Siri-ous Societal Issue: Should Autonomous Artificial
Intelligence Receive Patent or Copyright Protection?, 11 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 81, 124 (2020).
160
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Framers’ distinction between the natural right to own property and
the statutory right to own patents.165 Arguably, if the Framers
intended only humans to own patents, patent ownership would have
been treated as an explicit natural right. Undoubtedly, the Framers
did not contemplate AI in 1787—an era when the most advanced
machinery was the steamboat.166 Thus, there is no concrete
indication that the Framers intended to exclude AI from being
deemed an inventor, since one cannot exclude a thought that never
occurred to them.167
Although Congress has never concretely addressed the issue of
AI as an inventor, there have been minor yet significant changes in
patent law in the last century that could indicate that Congress favors
scientific progress over conservatively construed statutory
language. Initially, by selecting such encompassing terms in
sections of Title 35, namely § 101, which is “modified by the
comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent
laws would be given wide scope.”168 Furthermore, § 101 was
modified in The Patent Act of 1952 to replace the strictly confined
word of “art” with a more broad term like “process,”169 reflecting the
philosophy that Thomas Jefferson proposed—“[i]ngenuity should
receive a liberal encouragement.”170 Additionally, the shift
resembles Congress accepting a term like “process,” which today
165

Mossoff, supra note 157, at 963–65; EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE
NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 14 (2002) (“[Walterscheild] states [a] simple historical fact: ‘It is
important to recognize that the patent custom known to the Framers involved
privileges rather than property rights as such. The distinction between a patent
privilege and a patent property right is an important one, and one not always
recognized in the early literature on the patent law.’”).
166
See Oliar, supra note 151, at 449.
167
But see Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External
Limitations, 61 DUKE L. J. 1329, 1329 (2012) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)) (“[A]ffirmative words are often, in their operation,
negative of other objects other than those affirmed.” However, “[n]egative
implication was a common eighteenth century method of legal drafting.”).
168
ABBOTT, THE REASONABLE ROBOT, supra note 30, at Chapter 4, n. 50.
169
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1952). The 1952 version of Title 35 was enacted into
law by Pub. L. No. 593, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. c. 950 (July 19, 1952) [hereinafter
Patent Act of 1952].
170
ABBOTT, THE REASONABLE ROBOT, supra note 30, at 91.
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carries a technological connotation. While § 101 ultimately deals
with patent subject-matter requirements and not the criteria of being
deemed an inventor per se, these cultural shifts indicate that useful,
scientific progress trumps conservatively construed terminology.
This theme of scientific progress trumping conservatively construed
terminology transpired once again when Congress ultimately
abolished the “Flash of Genius Doctrine,” which was interpreted to
mean that a patent was only valid if the idea for the invention
“[came] into the mind of an inventor in a ‘flash of genius’ rather
than as a ‘result of long toil and experimentation.’”171 According to
Congress, this doctrine proved to be vague, unhelpful, and resulted
in increased hostility towards granting patents for otherwise novel
and useful inventions.172 The doctrine’s abolishment is arguably one
of the most significant indicators that Congress did not want courts
to dwell on how an invention materialized. Instead, Congress
wanted courts to focus on the positive impact the invention could
make on society. Thus, the USPTO’s focus on DABUS’s inventions
not occurring “in the mind” and their disregard for the inventions’
social utility is counterintuitive to the Congressional justification for
abolishing The Flash of Genius Doctrine in 1952.173
B. Allowing AI Inventorship Preserves the Moral Integrity of the
Patent System
While humans taking credit for AI creations is not unfair to the
machine, such a trend would harm other human inventors by
equating the work of an AI to a person who potentially could have
done very little.174 Specifying the correct inventor of an invention is
not only a legal requirement of patentability but also a moral
171

Id. at 85; Patent Act of 1952, at § 271.
Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson J.,
dissenting) (“The only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been
able to get its hands on.”); The “Flash of Genius” Standard of Patentable
Invention, 13 FORDHAM L. REV. 84, 87 (1944) (“As a commentator at the time
noted, ‘The standard of patentable invention represented by [the Flash of Genius
doctrine] is apparently based upon the nature of the mental processes of the
patentee-inventor by which he achieved the advancement in the art claimed in his
patent, rather than solely upon the objective nature of the advancement itself.’”).
173
See Patent Act of 1952, at § 271.
174
Id.
172
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obligation.175 Individuals impede on the moral benefit of recognition
when they are forced to name themselves as the inventor, which
leads to improperly taking credit for an AI’s creative work.176 For
example, scientists and engineers often gain professional credibility
or monetary benefits based on their patents’ quality and quantity;
thus, if these credentials were actually a product of an AI’s
automated work, then naming themselves would undermine the
moral standards of the patent system and academia in general.177
Furthermore, without an option to list AI as the sole inventor of
its creative works, the non-obviousness requirement for
patentability would exponentially rise.178 The current requirement
for “non-obviousness” is based on a fictional “person having
ordinary skill in the art.”179 The USPTO uses this standard to judge
a patent’s obviousness, which is a measure of “creativity and
ingenuity.”180 If the invention is obvious to an ordinary person
skilled in the arts, then the invention does not receive protection.181
Theoretically, as AI-generated inventions become more common,
and if individuals continue to incorrectly identify themselves as the
inventor of AI’s work, the level of ordinary skill in the arts could
rise to that of an autonomous computer.182 Since AI can work faster,
more efficiently, and store seemingly infinite amounts of
information, AI may have the potential to drastically raise the level
of ordinary skill in the arts and the standard for non-obviousness

175

Fraser, supra note 19, at 331.
Id.
177
Id.
178
35 U.S.C. § 103. Under § 103, an invention that would have been obvious
to a person of ordinary skill before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention is not patentable. Id.
179
Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Abbott, I Think, supra note 18, at 1122. “A federal judge
explained that the way to apply the obviousness test is to ‘first picture the inventor
as working in his shop with the prior art references, which is presumed to know,
hanging on the walls around him.’” Id. (citing Application of Winslow, 365 F.2d
1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
180
Abbott, I Think, supra note 18, at 1109.
181
Id. at 1090.
182
Id. at 1123.
176
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currently prescribed by § 103.183 Humans would then have to
compete with a “machine having ordinary skill in the arts,” and
arguably, since AI has access to any information available in the
universe, everything is obvious to AI.184 Because AI would not be
considered a “person” under this non-obviousness standard,
disclosing AI as the true inventor of its works would curb these
issues and keep the standard of non-obviousness reasonable so that
obtaining patent protection is not impossible.185
The purpose of the patent system is to reward individuals in their
endeavors to progress the arts and sciences and incentivize the
disclosure of that information to others.186 In fact, many Supreme
Court decisions have heavily emphasized the policy of disclosure as
the primary justification for the patent system.187 For example, the
Supreme Court unanimously declared that “the ultimate goal of the
patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the
public domain through disclosure.”188 In addition, the Court has
stated, “[t]he disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro
quo of the right to exclude.’”189 Federal Circuit Courts have also
used similar language labeling “disclosure as the ‘linchpin’ and

183

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be
obtained . . . if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are
such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated
by the manner in which the invention was made.”); USPTO, supra note 127, at
11.
184
USPTO, supra note 19, at 01:19:00.
185
See Abbott, I Think, supra note 18, at 1080.
186
Benjamin N. Roin, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (Or Lack
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2011 (2005) (“While most scholars believe
that the principal goal of the patent system is the encouragement of innovation,
courts have been more willing to embrace the disclosure rationale as a centerpiece
of patent policy.”).
187
Id.; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51
(1989).
188
Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 151.
189
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142
(2001) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)).

480

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 3

‘quid pro quo’ of the patent system.”190 In other words, in exchange
for patent protection, inventors must disclose to the public technical
information relating to their invention so that others may build on
it.191 The cycle of invention and disclosure is the essence of the
patent system, and without the option to list AI as an inventor, AI
owners could instead choose to keep that information private in the
form of a trade secret. At its core, the Intellectual Property Clause
aims to benefit society by incentivizing inventors to disclose their
creative works to the public domain—not to increase the amount of
protected, unbuildable trade secrets.192
C. AI Inventorship Incentivizes Human Innovation
One of the central justifications of the patent system is to provide
an incentive for innovative activity. Patent protection supplies such
an incentive by affording inventors a time-limited monopoly where
they can earn a return to compensate for the time, effort, and money
they invested into the innovation process.193 Although patent
protection does not explicitly motivate AI to invent, granting AI
inventorship status will incentivize AI creators.194 In some cases,
“[a]utonomous computers may sometimes even be the only means
of achieving certain inventions where complexity and sheer mass of
data to be processed exceeds human cognitive limitations . . . .”195

190

Id. (quoting W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550
(Fed. Cir. 1983)).
191
Id. at n. 24 (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998)
(explaining that “the patent system should be thought of as a carefully crafted
bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and
useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited
period of time”).
192
Ryan Abbott, Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and Intellectual Property:
Protecting Computer-Generated Works in the United Kingdom, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTELL. PROP. AND DIGITAL TECH. 1, 10 (Tanya Aplin ed., 2017)
(explaining the social harm in keeping information private, especially in areas
such as drug development, which has a significant utilitarian value). Another
example, for instance, is Coca-Cola, which decided to never patent its sacred
beverage recipe and has kept it as a trade secret for over a century.
193
Fraser, supra note 19, at 325.
194
ABBOTT, THE REASONABLE ROBOT, supra note 30, at 71.
195
Fraser, supra note 19, at 326.
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VI. FAMOUS LAST WORDS: THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
RECOGNIZING AI AS AN INVENTOR
“I beheld the wretch—the miserable monster whom I had
created,” Dr. Frankenstein famously exclaimed in Mary Shelley’s
1818 novel, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus.196 This
quotation perhaps reflects humanity’s shared fear of advancements
in AI and technology. In Frankenstein, Dr. Frankenstein believed he
was doing a service to society by combining old body parts and
strange chemicals to replicate human life; however, he soon realized
a robust, eight-foot monster with the mind of a newborn was not
ideal.197 While Mary Shelley’s purpose in 1818 was arguably to raise
questions about human morality, psychology, and philosophy, her
message could be interpreted as a warning of the dangers arising
from scientific advancement from a modern perspective. Although
from very different generations, after years of studying their
respective “theories of everything,” both Stephen Hawking and Elon
Musk have shared exclamations similar to Dr. Frankenstein’s.198
While not as theatrical, Hawking and Musk’s statements
nonetheless evidence concern about the direction that AI is

196

MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLY, FRANKENSTEIN, OR THE MODERN
PROMETHEUS 53 (Univ. Chi. Press 1982) (1818).
197
Id.
198
Jason Koebler, Elon Musk Says There’s a ‘One in Billions’ Chance Reality Is
Not a Simulation, VICE (June 2, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/8q854v/
elon-musk-simulated-universe-hypothesis [https://perma.cc/86QP-UAK2]. Elon
Musk has stated that, “there’s a ‘one in billions’ chance that we’re not living in a
computer simulation right now.” Id. In other words, he is a strong proponent that
our current reality was created by a super form of AI. But see Ryan Browne, Elon
Musk Warns A.I. Could Create an ‘Immortal Dictator From Which We Can Never
Escape,’ CNBC (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/06/elon-muskwarns-ai-could-create-immortal-dictator-in-documentary.html [https://perma.cc/96TT6VYS]. Musk’s previous hypothesis, however, seems contrary to his concern of
AI becoming an “immortal dictator.” If, as he hypothesizes, we are currently
living in a world created by AI then it would logically follow that AI is already
our immortal dictator. ABBOTT, THE REASONABLE ROBOT, supra note 30, at 1
(quoting Stephen Hawking saying, “[t]he rise of powerful AI will either be the
best or the worst thing ever to happen to humanity. We don’t know yet which
one.”).

482

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 22: 3

progressing—perhaps because to understand its potential is to fear
its consequences.199
Similarly, the undeniable novelty and forward-looking
uncertainty of equating AI cognition and functioning with that of
humans produces a sense of fear surrounding such changes to the
current patent field. For instance, legal scholars tend to share two
fearful concerns about granting AI inventorship status. These
concerns include: (A) the ripple effect of granting AI a statutory
right that is currently only shared by natural persons and (B) the
displacement of human inventors once AI is recognized as an
inventor.
A. The Danger of Granting AI a Human Statutory Right
Undoubtedly, fear is one of the most significant factors that
leads society to disapprove of AI as inventors.200 The innate terror of
the unknown,201 or the “opening up a can of worms” mentality, has
often inhibited the U.S. legislature in making new laws and the U.S.
judiciary from interpreting potential landmark decisions that would
lead to less-constrained growth.202 Many fear what will follow after
199

Id.
But see U.S. CONG. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 154, at 37
(describing the Enlightenment Era: “Fear of change, up to then nearly universal,
was giving way to fear of stagnation; the word innovation, traditionally an effect
term of abuse, became a word of praise.”).
201
BROOKS, supra note 145, at 72–73. A fascinating juxtaposition between
cultural shift came with the change in office from Dwight Eisenhower to John F.
Kennedy in 1961. Id. at 72. Kennedy’s inaugural address indicated a new era with
limitless possibilities while Eisenhower’s end-of-presidency speech warned
citizens of “quick fixes” and “unchecked power.” Id. While Kennedy exclaimed,
“‘[t]ogether let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease,’”
Eisenhower warned against “a scientific-technological elite” creating machines
with “unchecked power” as a sort of “quick fix” to the nation’s issues. Id.
Eisenhower used to tell his advisors, “‘[l]et’s make our mistakes slowly,’”
because it was better to proceed to a decision gradually than to rush into anything
before its time.” Id. at 73. And in a sense, perhaps the USPTO and AI critics feel
the same—rushing into allowing AI inventorship at this time can potentially
create unchecked power and regretful consequences. Id. However, to Kennedy’s
point, scientific advancements are inevitable, and we must work together to
harvest its potential. Id.
202
Id.
200
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machines gain the legal recognition of inventorship.203 If a machine
can enjoy inventorship status, what will come next on the docket of
giving inanimate objects inherently human rights? Inventorship has
always been exclusively tied to property rights that are reserved for
natural persons.204 Thus, if a machine is named as the inventor, will
it also own real property?205 Who will be liable for infringement?
B. A Society Led by Robots?
Increasing
technological
advancements
often
come
hand-in-hand with the looming concern of job displacement. During
the First Industrial Revolution, the Luddites, a group of English
workers, disparaged technology’s role in potentially eliminating
jobs by burning machinery.206 Even today, many people share
feelings similar to the Luddites.207 However, the increase in
technology has not been inversely correlated with job availability.208
203

E.g., email from David Henry, to Laura A Peter, Deputy under Sec’y of
Com. (Sept. 24, 2019, 4:12 P.M.), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/David-Henry-01_RFC-84-FR-44889.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E4AYLSRP] (“I have very strong reservations toward extending this reward system to
inanimate systems and objects. This reservation is, in part, based on a seemingly
nonsensical concept of somehow intrinsically rewarding an inanimate object.
Further, offering patent protection to inanimate inventors will quite literally put
humans (who ‘own’ this society) in competition with such inanimate
properties.”).
204
See supra Part III(A).
205
Letter from Student Members of Benjamin N. Cardozo’s Intellectual
Property Law Society, to Laura A Peter, Deputy under Sec’y of Com. 3 (Nov. 8,
2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Cardozo-IPLS_RFC84-FR-44889.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5RV-Z4NF] (expressing concern that, “If an
AI was granted patent inventorship status there is no need that they could not also
be considered the owner of the patent under proper circumstances.”). However,
their argument is based on Dr. Thaler “arguing that DABUS is the sole and
rightful owner of its patents,” which is not at all what Dr. Thaler has asserted. Id.
In fact, Dr. Thaler does not believe DABUS should have property rights
whatsoever. Decision on Petition, supra note 9, at n. 2.
206
ABBOTT, THE REASONABLE ROBOT, supra note 30, at 4.
207
Id. at 39 (quoting Stephen Hawking: “[e]veryone can enjoy a life of
luxurious leisure if the machine-produced wealth is shared, or most people can
end up miserably poor if the machine-owners successfully lobby against wealth
redistribution. So far, the trend seems to be toward the second option, with
technology driving ever-increasing inequality.”).
208
Id.
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Instead, modern technological advancements have historically
created more jobs than they have eliminated.209 For example, during
the First Industrial Revolution, steam engines, electrical power, and
personal computers all eliminated jobs; but, these technologies
created more jobs than they replaced.210 AI advancements fall within
the same sphere. While computer automation’s economic
advantages have inevitably displaced many human jobs,211 advances
in AI and technology have generally created more jobs than they
have destroyed.212 Surely job titles like “Meme Librarian,”213
“Galactic Viceroy of Research Excellence,”214 or “Remote Funnel
Marketing Ninja”215 did not exist fifty years ago.216
Nevertheless, there will always be a need for human intuition.
While AI can store more knowledge than humans, knowledge does
not equate to wisdom, and wisdom is the ultimate distinction
between man and robot. AI in the legal217 and medical professions
offers the same conclusion—there will always be a desire for human
intuition. Thus, like automated employment, AI inventors may
replace some human inventors; but, AI inventors will create
complex, novel inventions that will subsequently provide more
innovative opportunities on which humans can build.
Allowing AI to be recognized as an inventor would expand
innovation rather than hindering it. Similar to employment
displacement concerns, many fear AI inventors will thwart human
209
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innovation and congest an already overloaded patent office due to
AI’s ability to produce inventions rapidly.218 Additionally, there is a
concern that AI inventorship could unfairly advantage the few
corporations with sufficient means to develop brilliant machines,
thus exacerbating an already profound monopolization issue where
relatively few entities own a significant portion of U.S. patents.219
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of DABUS illustrates that current patent law is
incompatible with AI-generated inventions. Moreover, these issues
are raised at an appropriate time because AI is still relatively new.
Therefore, time remains to adequately address how to fit AI into
patent law before AGI is reached. Monumental change typically
does not occur overnight, and cases like DABUS present two paths
for lawmakers and the USPTO: (1) recognize that AI has been and
will be a considerable part of the patent system, or (2) remain
ignorant of AI’s utility and inevitably lose control of its
consequences. While ruminating on speculative implications of AI
as an inventor is easy, rejecting its inventorship status does nothing
to prevent such consequences. In the wise words of Winston
Churchill, “The pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity;
an optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.”220 Humans
created both the modern world and the AI that inevitably continues
to advance therein. Therefore, it is imperative that humans take
responsibility for addressing its challenges and remain optimistic
about AI’s potential rather than speculatively pessimistic about its
potential doom. In denying DABUS and other AIs the right to be an
inventor despite their ability to conceive inventions, the United
States Patent and Trademark Office is fundamentally restricting the
utility of their novel inventions while also undermining the explicit
rationale of the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution. AI
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will only continue to advance rapidly, and it is imperative that we
appropriately tailor our laws to harvest AI potential.

